We examine the reference-dependent risk preferences of Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) The notion of reference dependence was first introduced in economics by Markowitz (1952) and was formalized by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . Their reference-dependent model has become popular because it accommodates common behavior that is anomalous within the expected utility framework. However, Kahneman and Tversky, in both their original formulation and follow-up work, did not specify how the reference point is formed; this makes it difficult to derive general predictions and tests.
determine the reference point, Kőszegi and Rabin provide a solution concept that determines expectations endogenously. Their framework has inspired numerous applications. 1 Despite its popularity, it can be difficult to understand the implications of Kőszegi and Rabin's model for behavior, even in simple domains, due to its complicated functional form. For example, examining choice over risk, little is known about how to distinguish their theory from other models of reference dependence; these include earlier models of Gul (1991) , Bell (1985) , and Loomes and Sugden (1986) . All of these models have similar formulations as Kőszegi and Rabin's (2007) but specify a different process of reference point formation. More generally, it also is not clear how Kőszegi and Rabin' s model relates to other models of nonexpected utility theory that rely on completely different psychological intuitions (e.g., rank-dependent utility).
We focus on preferences induced by Kőszegi and Rabin's (2007) choice-acclimating personal equilibrium with linear gain-loss utility and refer to the functional form that they use as CPE (see Section IV for nonlinear gain-loss utility). Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) discuss how CPE captures the idea of a decision maker committing to a choice long before uncertainty is resolved (e.g., insurance decisions). Therefore, in line with the motivation provided by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) , the results in this paper should be interpreted in the context of choice where uncertainty will not be resolved immediately but rather in the future, so that the chosen lottery has time to become the reference point.
We describe the functional form used in CPE as well as other generalizations of expected utility in Section I. Our first result is to characterize when preferences with a CPE representation respect first-order stochastic dominance-we refer to this functional form as monotone CPE .
Section II provides a characterization of monotone CPE . We show that the intersection of rank-dependent utility (RDU ) and quadratic utility (Q), two well-known generalizations of expected utility, is exactly monotone CPE . To be precise, a preference has both RDU and Q representations if and only if it has a monotone CPE representation. We also show that the value of the coefficient of loss aversion is tightly linked to a decision maker's attitudes toward the convexification of indifferent lotteries. Using this result, we describe the equivalent quadratic and rank-dependent representations of CPE .
Our characterization is interesting because it implies that there is an equivalence between correct beliefs but nonstandard utility (à la CPE ), and a type of distorted beliefs but standard utility (à la RDU ). This may be surprising because, as Rabin (2007, p. 1048) note; "We assume that a person correctly predicts her probabilistic environment and her own behavior in that environment, so that her beliefs fully reflect the true probability distribution of outcomes." Moreover, looking purely at the functional form, it would seem to be the case that CPE should generate similar behavior to cumulative prospect theory (formalized by Tversky and Kahneman 1992) but without the effects of probability weighting. As we make clear, in the case of linear gain-loss utility, the correct comparison is actually the opposite-CPE is a subset of cumulative prospect theory, but with only probability weighting and no gain-loss utility.
In addition to CPE , there are other models that attempt to capture similar psychological intuitions regarding reference dependence and appear to be quite close in nature. Rabin (2007, p. 1049 ) themselves say, "Except that we specify the reference point as a lottery's full distribution rather than its certainty equivalent, [our] concept is similar to the disappointment-aversion models of Bell (1985) , Loomes and Sugden (1986), and Gul (1991) ." However, a corollary of our characterization is that the intersection of CPE and other classical models of endogenous reference points is only expected utility. In other words, despite trying to capture the same intuition about the effect of expectations on preferences, these models do so in distinct ways.
2 In fact, when a decision maker exhibits preferences represented by CPE and either Gul's or Bell-Loomes-Sugden's models, then they must be expected utility maximizers; in other words, they must not exhibit any reference dependence at all.
In Section III, we use our results to discuss the relationship between economic behavior, such as risk aversion and first-order risk aversion, and the parameters in CPE . We first identify what specifications of CPE are consistent with classical notions of risk aversion (i.e., aversion to mean-preserving spreads). Our results point to a tight linkage, for loss-averse decision makers, between preferences respecting two different orderings: the one induced by first-order stochastic dominance and the one induced by mean-preserving spreads. We then go on to relate the coefficient of loss aversion in monotone CPE to aversion to small-stakes lotteries (i.e., first-order risk aversion).
In Section IV, we consider generalizations of CPE , where the gain-loss utility function may not be linear. We discuss whether and how our results from previous sections extend when more general functional forms are allowed.
In Section V, we provide an example of why our results are useful in terms of applications. We show that CPE suffers from a very similar calibration critique to the one Rabin (2000) leveled against expected utility; plausible choices over small-stakes lotteries imply implausible choices over large-stakes lotteries. Thus, in order to address the Rabin critique, we must look beyond linear gain-loss functions. Section VI concludes, while the Appendix contains additional results and proofs.
I. Preliminaries and Functional Forms
Consider an interval [w, b] = X ⊂ ℝ of money. Let Δ X be the set of all simple lotteries (i.e., probability measures with finite support) on X . A lottery f ∈ Δ X is a function from X to [0, 1] such that ∑ x∈X f (x) = 1 and the number of prizes with nonzero probability is finite. f (x) represents the probability assigned to the outcome x in lottery f (we denote the cumulative distribution function of f as F ). For any lotteries f, g, we let αf + (1 − α) g be the lottery that yields x with probability αf (x) + (1 − α) g (x) . Denote by δ x the degenerate lottery that yields x with probability 1 (i.e., δ x (x) = 1 ). We will also refer to δ x simply as x . ≿ is a weak order over Δ X , which represents the decision maker's preferences over lotteries. For three outcomes x, y, z ∈ X , we denote the unit simplex of possible lotteries over those three outcomes as Δ x, y, z , or for an arbitrary set of three outcomes, Δ 3 . In this case, we will refer to the best outcome as δ ̅ , the worst outcome as δ ¯ , and the middle outcome as δ ̂ .
Choice-Acclimating Personal Equilibria.- Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) , building on Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) , extend the notion of reference dependence introduced in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) by having an individual's utility depend both on gain-loss utility (i.e., the comparison of outcomes to a reference point) and consumption utility (which depends only on the absolute value of the outcomes, rather than a comparison to a referent). This formulation is applied to lotteries in Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) , which introduced CPE. As mentioned, CPE is meant to capture situations where, at the time of the resolution of uncertainty, the choice is the reference point. Hence, the value of a lottery f is the sum of two separate components. The first is consumption utility (or just the expected Bernoulli utility of f ). The second is the gain-loss utility, where, ex post (after a realization) an individual compares what she actually received (for example x ) to what she expected to receive, which is the distribution implied by f . The individual compares x to each y that could have been expected and weighs those comparisons by the probability that y could have been realized. From an ex ante perspective, the individual takes the weighted average of these ex post comparisons, weighting by the probability that each x occurs. Thus, the utility value of a lottery f is
where u is a continuous increasing consumption (Bernoulli) utility function over final wealth and μ is the gain-loss function
where λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. 4 Loss aversion occurs when λ ≥ 1 , while loss-loving occurs when λ ≤ 1 . If λ = 1 , the preferences simplify to expected utility. We say a preference has a CPE representation if it can be represented using
For much of this paper, we will focus on preferences that respect first-order stochastic dominance and refer to these as monotone preferences. Proposition 7 of Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) points out that if loss aversion is a strong enough factor in preferences, then a decision maker will avoid any risk even though every outcome in the lottery is better than the outside option, thus violating first-order stochastic dominance. Our first result is to extend this intuition and characterize the class of monotone preferences; when λ is strictly greater than 2 or strictly less than 0 , then there exists a nondegenerate lottery strictly worse than the worst degenerate lottery. There are a variety of other preferences that are meant to capture behavior over risky outcomes. The standard model used in the literature is expected utility, which we refer to as EU. Different types of models generalize EU in a variety of ways. Here, we discuss three of them.
Quadratic.-One generalization of expected utility is quadratic preferences. A utility functional is said to be quadratic in probabilities if it can be expressed in the form
where ϕ : X × X → ℝ is a continuous function. 6 The quadratic functional form was introduced in Machina (1982) and further developed in Segal (1991, 1994) . One can think of ϕ as a function that compares any given outcome to any other given outcome (e.g., it gives the value of x when y is the reference point). The value of a lottery is then the average value of all of those comparisons over the outcomes with positive support. Viewed this way, the intuition for Q is very similar to that of CPE. 
Rank-
This form was introduced in Quiggin (1982) and has been examined by myriad authors. 7 We will use RDU to denote the class of rank-dependent utility functionals. Observe that when w is the identity function, V RDU reduces to the expected utility. 5 Many applications of reference dependence set λ ≥ 2 , which, in combination with CPE , implies that preferences are not monotone. 6 Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991) assume ϕ to be symmetric: ϕ (x, y) = ϕ (y, x) for all x, y . There is no loss of generality in restricting ϕ to be symmetric, since an arbitrary ϕ (x, y) can always be replaced by
. 7 See Abdellaoui (2002) for a recent characterization and references to the larger literature.
Otherwise, w acts to distort the decumulative distribution function associated with lottery f . The term w ( ∑ y≥x f (y) ) − w ( ∑ y>x f (y) ) measures the marginal probability contribution of x to the distorted decumulative distribution function.
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Reference-Dependent Models.-We now describe other reference-dependent models that feature endogenous reference points. They attempt to capture similar psychological intuitions, use similar functional forms, and appear to be quite close in nature. Recall that in Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) the reference point is a lottery's full distribution. In contrast, in the disappointment theory developed by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) , the reference point is expected (Bernoulli) utility without disappointment, while in Gul's (1991) model, the reference point includes the expected losses due to disappointment-the reference point is determined by the full certainty equivalent of the lottery.
Gul's (1991) theory of disappointment aversion is a special case of a more general class of preferences. Since they share the same intuition, we describe this more general class, betweenness preferences, which was introduced by Chew (1983) , Fishburn (1983) , and Dekel (1986) . Betweenness, B , functionals have the form
where ν is continuous and an increasing function of its first argument. These preferences feature a type of endogenous reference dependence, where V B ( f ) is the reference point used to evaluate outcomes.
The model of disappointment theory introduced by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) has proven quite popular in applications, as the reference point is neither stochastic nor recursively defined, but is instead simply the expected consumption (Bernoulli) utility of the lottery. Given a function u , denote the expected value of u given lottery f as E u ( f ) . The value of a lottery is then
where μ is a piecewise linear function with μ (0) = 0 (as in V CPE ).
9

II. Relationships
Our main result highlights the connection between well known but seemingly unrelated models. We show that the intersection of quadratic and rank-dependent models is exactly equal to Kőszegi and Rabin's model. In other words, the intersection of two models that people have found useful in capturing behavior has its own independent attraction. 10 8 RDU accommodates probability weighting while ensuring preferences respect first-order stochastic dominance. 9 The original papers introducing this model do not require μ to be piecewise linear; however we make this restriction in order to make the model as comparable to CPE as possible. 10 Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991) provide an example showing that the intersection of RDU and Q is nonempty. Their example is a special case of monotone CPE , although their functional form makes the representation appear different at first glance.
THEOREM 1: A preference has both Q and RDU representations if and only if it has a monotone CPE representation.
Theorem 1 highlights the fact that the monotone CPE model has a very strong predictive power. In addition, Theorem 1 completely characterizes preferences with monotone CPE representations. Since both quadratic and rank-dependent models have already axiomatic foundations, Theorem 1 indirectly provides axiomatic foundations for Kőszegi and Rabin's model. Q has been characterized using preferences in Segal (1991, 1994) . There exist numerous characterizations of RDU using preferences; a recent one is Abdellaoui (2002) .
In order to relate the parameters of the model, u and λ , to behavior and conduct comparative statics, as we do in the following section and the online Appendix, we first need to know to what extent u and λ are uniquely identified from observed behavior.
PROPOSITION 2: For any preference with a monotone CPE representation, u is unique up to affine transformation and λ is unique.
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Analogous to the expected utility, u is unique up to affine transformation. Moreover, λ (the parameter governing loss aversion) is uniquely identified from observed behavior. However, our characterization does not identify which agents have λ ≥ 1 or λ ≤ 1 . In order to do so, we discuss two well-known relaxations of independence axiom. The first is mixture aversion. Preferences satisfy mixture aversion if, given two lotteries that are indifferent, any mixture of them is worse than the original lotteries (mixture aversion is often called " quasiconvexity" in the literature). Mixture-loving can be defined analogously.
Mixture aversion is a necessary condition of neither Q nor RDU. However, CPE preferences are always mixture-averse if λ is greater than 1 and mixture-loving if λ is smaller than 1 . For monotone preferences, this result is a corollary of Wakker (1994) , who showed that for preferences in RDU , pessimism (optimism) is equivalent to mixture aversion (loving). Theorem 1 immediately implies that any preference with a monotone CPE representation has both Q and RDU representations. We now formally relate V CPE to both V Q and V RDU . To see the first relationship, simply define quadratic functional ϕ as follows:
, simply reflects the consumption utility term of V CPE , while the second component, 
Note that both representations share the same consumption utility u . The difference comes from distortions introduced by either gain-loss or a probability weighting function. For example, when λ ∈ [1, 2] , w λ is a convex function, which means that preferences are "pessimistic," or, equivalently, worse outcomes are overweighted. Hence, Proposition 4 implies that loss aversion ( λ ≥ 1 ) can be considered a type of pessimism, in that loss-averse individuals overweight bad outcomes.
We finish this section by relating CPE with other reference-dependent models that share similar psychological intuitions. The next result proves that these models of endogenous reference dependence are capturing reference dependence in distinct ways.
PROPOSITION 5: If a decision maker's preference is represented by both V CPE and V BLS (or V B ), she must be an expected utility maximizer.
Any preferences that are fully consistent with CPE's notion of reference dependence, as well as Bell-Loomes-Sugden's, must not exhibit any reference dependence at all-they must be EU. The same applies for any preference with a betweenness representation. These distinctions point out that models of reference dependence capture intuitions not only about loss aversion (or first-order risk aversion), but also about other important behavior, such as attitudes toward randomization. Consider two lotteries f and g , that a decision maker is indifferent between. If her preferences can be represented by V B , then she must also be indifferent between f and any mixture of f and g . In contrast, if her preferences are represented by V CPE , she must weakly prefer f to any mixture of f and g . These distinctions enable us to distinguish between models of reference dependence. Figure 1 summarizes the results of this section, showing how CPE relates to other models of nonexpected utility.
14 12 More generally, we can show that preferences in CPE have a representation that is exactly the same as V RDU but dropping the restriction that w is a strictly increasing function.
13 Delquié and Cillo (2006) derive an equivalent result in the context of their model, although the way they prove their result is formally distinct from our proof.
14 For a demonstration that BLS and B intersect only at the expected utility please see the proof of Proposition 5.
III. The Economic Meaning of Parameters: u and λ
Given the uniqueness of the CPE representation, we can analyze what the economic interpretations of the parameters of the model are. We show that they are closely tied to the well-studied phenomena of ( second-order) risk aversion and first-order risk aversion.
15 First, we examine when individuals' observed preferences are in accordance with the classical notion of risk aversion-aversion to mean-preserving spreads.
DEFINITION 1: A decision maker is risk-averse if whenever g differs from f by a mean-preserving spread, she prefers f over g .
We show that, so long as 1 ≤ λ ≤ 2 , u has the standard interpretation: concavity is equivalent to risk aversion. Intuitively, it would seem that loss aversion should enhance any aversion to mean-preserving spreads that u alone induces. This intuition is true if u is linear. However, more generally it is not the case that there is a trade-off between risk and loss aversion in terms of observed behavior. Instead, both a concave consumption utility u and loss aversion λ ≥ 1 are necessary conditions for an individual to be risk-averse. These conditions are not sufficient though. An individual who has a nonlinear u , and is also so loss-averse so that their preferences are no longer monotone, will not always be averse to mean-preserving spreads.
15 Similar analyses can be done for other models of reference dependence. For example, Gul (1991) provides similar linkages between parameters and behavior in his model of disappointment aversion. 16 An alternative way of defining risk aversion is that the certainty equivalent of a lottery is less than the expected value of that lottery. However, certainty equivalent is not always well-defined for preferences with a nonmonotone CPE representation. Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) develop intuitions relating riskiness of a lottery to preferences when u is linear (e.g., their Proposition 13): they demonstrate that adding mean-preserving risk to a degenerate lottery reduces the value of the lottery. Proposition 6 implies that these intuitions relating riskiness to preferences generalize only when u is concave and λ ∈ [1, 2] . In fact, when u is nonlinear, the only time a decision maker will be risk-averse is when the loss aversion parameter is between 1 and 2 . Thus, intuitions developed around increases in risk for monotone CPE will generally not extend to nonmonotone ones. Moreover, Rabin (2007, p. 1060 ) mention that violations of first-order stochastic dominance could be interpreted as a form of risk aversion: "We also feel that the preference for a stochastically dominated lottery captures in extreme form the strong risk aversion consumers display." As Proposition 6 points out, if individuals are loss-averse, then unless u is linear, violations of first-order stochastic dominance are inconsistent with standard notions of risk aversion-violations of first-order stochastic dominance by preferences imply violations of the ordering imposed by mean-preserving spreads.
We now turn to examining the distinct effects of the loss aversion parameter. Given the results just derived, we will focus on the case of monotone preferences.
17
In the behavioral literature, λ has been associated with attitudes to small-stakes lotteries, and λ ≥ 1 has been thought to capture something described as loss aversion: see Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) . In line with this, Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) specifically describe λ > 1 as capturing aversion to small-stakes risk and provide sufficient conditions so that an individual will always choose a degenerate lottery over a degenerate lottery plus some noise.
In order to provide a characterization that relates λ to small-stakes risk preferences we will rely on Segal and Spivak's (1990) analysis of first-order risk aversion. Individuals who are first-order risk-averse display an aversion to small-stakes lotteries. As in Segal and Spivak (1990) , we will measure the extent to which individuals dislike (or enjoy) small-stakes lotteries using the notion of risk premium (i.e., the difference between the expected value and certainty equivalent of a lottery). Denote π ( f ) as the risk premium of the lottery f . An individual has first-order risk attitudes if the derivative of the risk premium of a fair lottery does not go to zero as the stakes in the lottery become arbitrarily small. We will focus on situations in which individuals have a wealth level w and are facing a lottery ϵ f , where ϵ is a scalar that multiplies the sizes of all the outcomes in lottery f . We denote this situation as w + ϵ f . the individual will refuse all better than fair lotteries that are sufficiently small. CPE preferences can exhibit first-order risk preferences; in addition, their attitudes are governed entirely by λ . We show that λ > 1 , as is commonly assumed, is equivalent to first-order risk aversion. In order to simplify our statements, we will make the assumption that u is differentiable everywhere on its domain (which we refer to as "everywhere differentiable").
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose (u, λ) represents a decision maker's preference with u everywhere differentiable. Then the decision maker is first-order risk-averse (loving) at all wealth levels if and only if λ > 1 ( λ < 1 ).
Our result thus tightly links the parameter λ , described as the parameter that captures loss aversion by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) , to the phenomenon of first-order risk aversion. We view this as supporting the opinion of Köbberling and Wakker (2005, p. 125) , who state that "…first-order risk aversion, discussed mostly for rank-dependent utility, may be driven by loss aversion to a great extent."
In conjunction with previous results, Proposition 7 indicates an interesting behavioral equivalence that occurs in CPE. Individuals are first-order risk-averse (i.e., loss-averse) if and only if they are mixture-averse.
IV. Nonlinear Gain-Loss Functionals
Up until this point, we have focused on the case of linear gain-loss utility; however, there is no reason to assume that this is always the case. In this section, we consider a more general structure, where the gain-loss function does not have to be linear. This can be thought of as a way of enabling the degree of exhibited loss aversion to be stake-dependent. We define the general CPE (GCPE) functional as
and λ is the loss aversion parameter.
Moreover, ν is a continuous, strictly increasing function that maps from the positive reals to the positive reals, ν (0) = 0 , and ν is differentiable everywhere but 0. In line with the literature, we will also focus on the case where ν exhibits diminishing sensitivity: ν is concave.
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Considering this more general functional form allows us to understand more clearly the role that the linearity of the gain-loss functional plays in V CPE . In particular, that the linearity of gain-loss utility is equivalent having a rank-dependent representation. In other words, linearity guarantees a consistent weighting function given a rank-dependent representation.
Mirroring our previous analysis, we first characterize when, given a particular ν , preferences will respect first-order stochastic dominance. Because GCPE models have different gain-loss utility functions ν , we must interpret the weighting of gains relative to losses (i.e., λ ) differently in terms of behavior.
PROPOSITION 8: Let a preference be represented by V GCPE . Then it respects first-order stochastic dominance if and only if
This result indicates that as ν ′(0) increases, or as individuals become more sensitive to receiving a very small gain or loss, the range of λ s that generate behavior consistent with first-order stochastic dominance shrinks. For example, if ν (z) = log (z + 1) , then ν ′ (0) = 1 ; so 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2 generates preferences that respect first-order stochastic dominance (as in CPE). In contrast, if ν (z) = √ _ z , then lim z→ 0 + ν ′(z) = ∞ , and so the only λ that allows preferences to be monotone is λ = 1 (i.e, the expected utility).
Many of the relationships between CPE and other non-EU models of choice discussed in Section II extend to GCPE.
PROPOSITION 9: Any preference represented by V GCPE also admits a quadratic representation.
Proposition 9 immediately implies that if a decision maker's preference can be represented by both V GCPE and V B (or V BLS ), she must be an expected utility maximizer. 21 However, any preference represented by a nonlinear V GCPE does not admit an RDU representation. This is true even if we restrict ourselves to monotone preferences.
Despite the fact the RDU toolkit is no longer applicable, we can still use methods developed for the quadratic utility functionals to understand GCPE. These include understanding when an individual with a GCPE representation is risk-averse. An immediate implication of Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991) is that a decision maker with a GCPE representation is risk-averse if and only if u (x) + u (y) + (1 − λ) ν (| u (x) − u (y) |) is concave in x for all y .
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Recall that we were able to demonstrate a previously unknown relationship between loss aversion/loving behavior and attitudes toward mixing lotteries within the CPE framework. This provides a powerful test of the predictions of CPE. We extend this result and show that mixture aversion is also equivalent to λ ≥ 1 in GCPE.
PROPOSITION 10: If a preference has a GCPE representation, then, for any Δ 3 , (i) indifference curves are ellipses and (ii) preferences are mixture-averse (loving) if and only if λ ≥ 1 ( λ ≤ 1 ).
Although we have focused our attention on situations where ν exhibits decreasing marginal sensitivity, the case of increasing marginal sensitivity is also interesting. Mean-variance preferences, where individuals have preferences over the first two moments of lotteries, is a special case of GCPE in this case: if ν (z) = z 2 , it is easy to verify that
, and so mean-variance preferences occur when u is linear.
V. Discussion
We believe our theoretical results are useful in and of themselves, because they help illuminate relationships between models that are attempting to explain the same set of stylized facts. In addition, we also think our results provide new ways to link CPE to common choice patterns, a point we explore in this section with a stylized example.
An important argument against the plausibility of the expected utility is the Rabin (2000) critique: under very mild conditions it is impossible to find expected utility preferences that generate plausible behavior over both small-and large-stakes lotteries. Rabin's calibration result and Safra and Segal's (2005) extension show how local behavior relates to global behavior.
As we will show, monotone CPE representations also suffer from a modified version of Rabin's critique. Theorem 5 in Safra and Segal (2005) shows that if (i) preferences are in RDU; (ii) u has either decreasing absolute risk aversion everywhere or increasing absolute risk aversion everywhere; and (iii) the decision maker plausibly rejects small-stakes lotteries when added to any gamble defined over relevant wealth levels, then the decision maker should also (implausibly) reject very attractive large-stakes lotteries. By Proposition 4, a decision maker whose preferences have a monotone CPE representation satisfying condition (ii) also suffers from this calibration critique. 23 For example, assume u exhibits decreasing absolute 22 Although it might seem that this condition could be easily satisfied, this is not the case. In fact, in many situations, even " reasonable-looking" parameterizations of GCPE will not be risk-averse. For example, if u is linear, and ν is strictly concave, then preferences with a GCPE representations are risk-averse if and only if they are expected utility. To see this, observe that necessary conditions for concavity are that both risk aversion. Then, as Safra and Segal (2005) demonstrate, if a decision maker whose preferences have a monotone CPE representation rejects a lottery that gives −100 with probability 0.5 and 110 with probability 0.5 when added to all gambles defined over a large enough wealth level with a lower bound of w , she will reject a lottery that gives −20,000 with probability 0.0054 and 100,000 − ζ with probability 0.9946 for a sequence of ζ s converging to 0 at wealth level w . Linearity of CPE is crucial for the calibration result of Safra and Segal (2005) . If the assumption that μ (the gain-loss function) is linear is relaxed, it is possible to generate plausible small-and large-stakes risk aversion. Kőszegi and Rabin's (2007) Table 1 does exactly this. However, the most tractable form of Kőszegi and Rabin's (2007) model, that with linear gain-loss utility, cannot avoid an extension of the Rabin critique. Thus, in order to model individuals who exhibit plausible behavior over both small-and large-stakes lotteries, we must turn to nonlinear gain-loss functionals.
VI. Conclusion
This paper contributes to understanding behavior under loss aversion and endogenous reference-point formation. In particular, understanding where CPE fits within the taxonomy of non-EU theory can be extremely helpful for both theoretical and empirical researchers. It allows researchers to make use of a larger toolkit of methods and to better understand how to distinguish models of reference dependence from one another. In particular, the relationships developed in Section II provide new opportunities to relate theory to data.
Theorem 1 implies that we can test CPE using existing data originally designed to test other models of choice under risk (e.g., RDU). Thus, subject to the experimental design correctly capturing the psychology underlying CPE , our results allow us to bring over 20 years of existing experimental evidence to bear on CPE. For example, the weighting function of CPE in its rank-dependent representation must be strictly convex, a prediction at odds with much of the existing literature (for one example, among many, see Gonzalez and Wu 1999) .
More generally, we discuss multiple classes of models which incorporate endogenous reference points. All these classes accommodate many of the same stylized facts, including small-stakes risk aversion. Thus, many experimental tests of these behaviors cannot serve to distinguish between competing explanations. However, as the results of our paper make clear, these models differ in their predictions regarding attitudes toward randomization. As Proposition 3 demonstrates, preferences with a loss-averse CPE representation are always mixture-averse. In contrast, other models of reference-dependent preferences exhibit distinct attitudes toward mixing: Gul's (1991) preferences are both mixture-averse and mixture-loving; while Bell-Loomes-Sugden's preferences are mixture-averse on part of their domain and mixture-loving on part of the domain. Thus, examining these attitudes represents a potentially useful area of research in order to better understand reference-point formation. 
PROOF:
First we need to show that a preference with a monotone CPE representation also has a Q representation. This is an immediate corollary of Proposition 9. Second, we illustrate that if a preference has a monotone CPE representation then it also has a RDU representation.
CLAIM 1: Every preference with a monotone CPE representation must have a RDU representation.
This proof is constructive. Let (u, λ) be a monotone CPE representation of ≿. Then we illustrate that w λ is a particular probability weighting structure such that (i) w λ (z) = (λ − 1) z 2 + (2 − λ) z , (ii) (u, w λ ) is a rank-dependent representation of ≿. Initially, we prove this claim for lotteries where all outcomes are equally likely. Since this set of lotteries is dense in Δ X this proves the claim for all lotteries (see Chew, Epstein, and Segal 1991) .
Take a lottery f such that all outcomes are equally likely and consider the set of outcomes x such that f (x) ≠ 0 . Label them x 1 , … , x n in increasing order. We now utilize the quadratic representation, that is,
We fix the second argument x i in the quadratic representation of CPE and explicitly
That is equal to
Now we take the additional sum over the second argument x i . That is,
Notice that if j < i then u ( x j ) has a weight of λ . if j > i then u ( x j ) has a weight of 2 − λ . We now identify the coefficient in front of u ( x i ) in the previous formula.
The ith term will appear n − i times as the lower outcome in pairs of outcomes and i − 1 times as the greater outcome in pairs of outcomes. Thus, the coefficient in
which is equal to
Hence, we can rewrite the entire equation as follows:
We will write the equation above in terms of RDU representation. Consider
Notice that w is convex for 1 ≤ λ ≤ 2 , and is concave for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 . It is routine to check that
is equivalent to the quadratic representation. Hence, this proves the claim for lotteries where all outcomes are equally likely. Since this set of lotteries is dense in Δ X this proves the claim for all lotteries by continuity. Notice, when λ > 2 (or λ < 0 ), w λ is not increasing. Hence, it will violate first-order stochastic dominance. Moreover, the relationship is strict because w λ is a particular probability weighting structure. ∎ We now prove the opposite direction: any preference with both Q and RDU representations has also a monotone CPE representation. We first prove a simple claim required for the rest of the proof. 
Consider the rank-dependent representation of the preference and the indifference curves they induce:
We can rewrite this as
The slopes of the indifference curves are
.
Note that w is a continuous monotone function so it must be nondifferentiable on a measure 0 set. Suppose that the weighting function w is not differentiable at 1 − p . Then there exists a q such that
is not defined. Thus, at Now, let (u, w) be an RDU representation of ≿ . Given any two outcomes we normalize the utility of the better outcome to 1 and utility of the lesser outcome to 0 . Choose x ( p) such that
We have V ( f 1 ) = u (x ( p)) w ( p) + u (0) (1 − w ( p)) = u (1) w (1) = V ( f 2 ) . Then we must have
Notice that x ( p) > 1 . Since we have a quadratic functional, we must have the following: for any f 1 , f 2 , Given that w is differentiable, we know that , we must get 0 . That is,
Then we end up with the following differential equation:
We now use the method of power series; that is, we look for a solution of the form:
Since w is a weighting function, we have w (0) = 0 and w (1) = 1 . While the former implies c 0 = 0 , the latter implies ∑ n=0 ∞ c n = 1 . Then we take the derivative: 
Consider a quadratic function ϕ that represents ≿ which is not equivalent to expected utility. Then ϕ is unique up to affine transformations by Theorem 2 of Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991) . This implies u is unique up to an affine transformation and λ is unique. To see one direction, consider an affine transformation of u′ = αu + β where α > 0 and define a ϕ ′:
ϕ′(x, y) = 1 This is an affine transformation of ϕ , hence it represents ≿ by Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991) . For the other direction, assume (u, λ) and (v, λ ′ ) both represent ≿. Let ϕ and ϕ′ be the quadratic representation of (u, λ) and (v, λ ′ ) , respectively. By Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991) , there exist α > 0 and β such that ϕ′(x, y) = αϕ (x, y) + β . Thus, ϕ′(x, x) = αϕ (x, x) + β . Since by construction ϕ (x, x) = u (x) , we must have v (x) = αu (x) + β . Then it is routine to check that λ = λ ′ . ∎ PROPOSITION 3: For any preference with a CPE representation (u, λ) , it satisfies mixture aversion (loving) if and only if λ ≥ 1 ( λ ≤ 1 ).
The proof for monotone CPE is discussed in the text. For nonmonotone CPE , observe that Observation 2 of Wakker (1994) , which proves that a convex weighting function implies a convex V RDU (in terms of probabilities), and so mixture aversion (and similar a concave weighting function implies mixture-loving) does not depend on the monotonicity assumption of the weighting function. Moreover, looking at the proof of Theorem 1, it is clear that we can represent any preferences in CPE and represented by (u, λ) with a representation that has the same functional form as RDU with representation (u, w) but is not in the actual class RDU , because w is not monotone. However, w is still convex (concave) if and only if λ ≥ ( ≤ ) 1 .
To go the other way, observe that λ is a scalar, so the weighting function must be either (globally) convex or concave. ∎
